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This article is an attempt to negotiate the spaces between a number of 
problematic positions concerning Hinduism and human rights through the close 
study of one particular text, the Rājadharmaparvan of the Mahābhārata. By 
examining safeguards and provisions for subjects articulated in the text’s 
discourse of kingly duty, it engages with some of the arguments forwarded in the 
theoretical literature on human rights. Here it interrogates, in particular, the idea 
that Hinduism is distinctively incompatible with these norms in a way other 
historical or cultural traditions are not. The article concludes by asking whether it 
is possible to counter Eurocentric tendencies in global debates without furthering 
illiberal agendas within local ones. Discussing the appropriation of ‘Raj dharma,’ 
and the texts that deal with it, by the Hindu Right, it briefly outlines some recent 
moves in human rights theory that help facilitate the reclamation of a rich and 
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Negotiating the spaces: exploring issues of human rights in an Indian text 
 
Relatively little has been written on Hinduism in the theoretical literature 
on human rights, and most of what has draws largely on the tradition’s texts in 
order to engage with two main areas of debate: human rights and cultural 
relativism, and attempts to formulate a history of human rights; areas which 
intersect at a number of important points. Until fairly recently, much of the 
discussion of cultural relativism (broadly, different perspectives on the 
relationship between ‘universal’ human rights and the ethical and social norms of 
diverse and particular cultures) has been conducted within a paradigm of 
compatibility, in which existing or historical cultures and traditions are measured 
against a set of overarching norms and principles encapsulated by the notion of 
human rights. Within this paradigm, Hinduism has, for the most part, fared 
badly. The human rights theorist Jack Donnelly, for example, one of the 
staunchest advocates of this negative evaluation in all but his most recent work, 
has cited the case of ‘traditional Hindu India’ as one which made it ‘painfully 
clear’ (2003, 84) that fundamental agreement with the principles of human rights 
could not be found across all cultures. Drawing largely on some of the tradition’s 
social teachings, Donnelly argued that for Hinduism ‘[e]qual and inalienable 
human rights held by all members of the species Homo sapiens… would be a 
moral outrage, an affront to and attack on natural order and justice’ (2003, 83). 
 
Although it should be noted that Donnelly himself has considerably 
modified his approach in an extensive revision to the work where this appeared 
(2013),1 the idea that Hinduism is fundamentally incompatible with human 
rights, in a way that distinguishes it from other ‘traditional’ cultures, still lingers. 
Indeed, it is sufficiently prevalent that Menski has talked about ‘a rabid anti-
Hindu stance in global academia’ (2012, 80). While this may be overstating the 
case, Menski’s cri de coeur will resonate with many living and working in the 
tradition. Discussions of the history of human rights – or what Baxi, highlighting 
some of the issues at play, calls their ‘originary meta-narratives’ (2012, 46) – 
often fail to include Hindu sources, or do so in a way that gives rise to other 
problems. Discussions of the ‘common consensus,’ the fundamental cross-
cultural ethical principles underpinning human rights, will again often reference 
other major religious and intellectual traditions but omit Hinduism; an omission 
that serves to reinforce the idea that it, distinctively, does not share these 
values.2  Donnelly’s earlier assertion that Hinduism has no sense of a common 
humanity (the core of his argument concerning distinctive incompatibility), 
meanwhile, continues to be repeated in the works of others: Griffin uses it as 
part of his broader argument that human rights can take root in even historically 
unpromising environments (2008, 140-2), while Lauren appears to draw on it as 
an example of a context where ‘some people were not regarded as being fully 
human’ (2011, 26-7).3  
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Attempts to counter this, or to engage more comprehensively with the 
broad spectrum of beliefs and practices subsumed under the label ‘Hinduism,’ 
have tended to focus on those areas of the tradition offering more immediate 
resonance with the vision of human rights: the universalism of the Upaniṣads; 
the long history of accommodating pluralism and diversity; the sense of inter-
connectedness implicit in the notions of dharma and karma.4 The relative paucity 
of direct engagement with the societal strands of the tradition in this regard, 
however, suggests that there is still a sense, even amongst those sympathetic to 
the need for more culturally plural narratives, that these are unlikely to prove 
fertile territory. The underlying reasons for this, of course, hardly need spelling 
out. They have rested, in particular, on the issue of caste: the system of social 
organisation with which India has grappled for millennia and continues to 
grapple with today. It is important to acknowledge at the outset that aspects of 
the caste system, particularly abuses associated with the notion of 
untouchability, are indeed fundamentally incompatible with human rights, and 
there is no shortage of internal voices making this point.5 The problem with 
Donnelly’s original position is not that he identified these aspects as problematic, 
but that he concentrated on them to the exclusion of all else.  
 
Valuable as a broader sweep of the tradition may be, however, there are 
compelling reasons why it is precisely within a more contextualised exploration of 
its discussions of society and polity that the focus needs to be placed. Not only is 
the charge of incompatibility best interrogated within the side of the tradition 
that gives rise to it, but too great an emphasis on Hinduism’s metaphysical 
teachings may also, in turn, generate problems of its own; not the least being 
that it serves to reinforce the stereotype of India as ‘spiritual’ and ‘unworldly,’ a 
monolithic reading of the culture from without forcefully critiqued by Sen yet 
continuing to colour much of the debate.6 Always problematic - as Sen says, it 
sets up a ‘pre-selected “East-West” contrast… between Aristotle and Euclid on 
the one hand, and wise and contented Indian peasants on the other’ (2005, xiv) 
- this stereotype is particularly unhelpful in the context of human rights, where 
there is a tendency to accord more value to ideas deemed ‘secular’ than those 
regarded as ‘religious’: a tendency which, as Menski notes, fundamentally 
disadvantages the world’s many ‘religio-cultural and socio-legal normative 
systems that are deeply hybrid entities’ (2012, 73), such as Hinduism.  
 
The historian John Headley provides a good example of how this 
disadvantage plays out in the construction of historical narratives for human 
rights. Forwarding the argument that their key foundational principles are only 
explored in any depth within the ‘complexity and polyphony of the European 
intellectual context’ (2008, 78), he dismisses examples that would counter this, 
such as those of Akbar and Aśoka from India, as ‘disparate, scattered cases, 
random lights,’ continuing ‘But where the continuity? the sustained influence? the 
religiously neutral legal framework?’ (2008, 5).  Headley’s otherwise careful study 
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is scattered with similar claims: the idea of a common humanity, the acceptance 
of dissent, even ‘the very capacity for self-criticism and review’ (2008, 143), are 
variously cited as ‘unique’ to the intellectual traditions of Europe; if they emerge 
elsewhere it is only as ‘fleeting, fitful expressions’ (2008, 7), ‘scattered 
moments… upon which the Western impetus can attempt to graft itself’ (2008, 
5).7 Headley is by no means alone in constructing a largely European pedigree 
for human rights: explicitly or implicitly it is something that informs the majority 
of the histories that exist. It is immediately obvious why claims such as this need 
to be challenged. Not only do they bolster the perception of human rights as, in 
Baxi’s words, ‘the gift of the West to the Rest’ (2012, 38), with the damaging 
consequences he goes on to enumerate, they also display an attitude that Sen 
has elsewhere, rather generously, labelled ‘parochial’ (2009, xiv).8 Defensive 
responses to this attitude have played their part in the development of positions 
inimical to human rights in a number of post-Colonial contexts. Contesting these 
claims, therefore, is a necessary prelude to contesting those.  
 
This article will engage with some of these issues through the close study 
of one particular text, the Rājadharmaparvan of the Mahābhārata: the section of 
the longer of India’s two great epics that sets out the duties of the king. By 
considering in some detail the safeguards and provisions for the welfare of 
subjects that the text articulates within its discourse of kingly duty, it will seek to 
interrogate both the notion that Hinduism is in some way distinctively 
incompatible with human rights, and also certain of the broader claims put 
forward by writers such as Headley. This, the major part of the study, will be 
structured around two questions. Firstly, to what extent do the safeguards and 
provisions outlined in the Rājadharmaparvan correspond to those afforded by 
human rights? Is there, at the least, some element of normative agreement 
between the two? Secondly, and more importantly for these debates, are these 
norms formulated in a way that is supportive of, or inimical to, the core 
principles of universality and common humanity upon which human rights are 
founded?  
 
As the title suggests, however, it is also an attempt to negotiate the 
spaces. Although the primary focus will be to contest the validity of these claims, 
the final section will address a rather different set of questions: Is it possible to 
draw on a tradition’s texts to counter Eurocentric tendencies in global debates 
without unwittingly supporting illiberal agendas within local ones? To what extent 
are the two related? What approaches might enable one to step away from 
problematic positions in one direction without ending up with uneasy bedfellows 
in the other? These questions are particularly acute within the political landscape 
of contemporary India, where it is these same texts on which those espousing 
the ideology of Hindu Nationalism have drawn in order to motivate and justify 
abuse. The article will conclude by briefly outlining some of the more recent 
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The Mahābhārata’s Rājadharmaparvan (“The Section Pertaining to the 
Duties of the King”) is one of several classical Indian discourses on polity dating 
back to the first few centuries BCE, and it has been chosen as the focus of this 
study for several reasons. Firstly, it has been rather less discussed in relation to 
human rights than others, such as the Manusmṛti (‘The Laws of Manu’), 
Kauṭilya’s Arthaśāstra and the Edicts of Aśoka.9 Although the Rājadharmaparvan 
shows considerable overlap and inter-textual engagement with these, as well as 
sharing some of the historical contexts that gave rise to them, its tone and 
setting is rather different. Secondly, it is part of a longer work that is widely 
recognised and authoritative. One of the major sacred texts of Hinduism, as well 
as an important cultural resource for India more broadly, the Mahābhārata has a 
popularity and relevance that endures today; Gurcharan Das’s recent use of it as 
a framework for exploring contemporary issues (2009) is one of the many 
examples of this. Anything found within it, therefore, cannot easily be dismissed 
as either ‘scattered’ or ‘fleeting’; it will represent the centrality and continuity of 
concern critical to the kind of claim that Headley is making. Moreover, the 
Mahābhārata as a whole is notoriously multivocal. Containing voices debating 
vigorously over a broad range of topics and drawing on multiple strands of 
Indian thought in the process, it provides a particularly rich environment for 
listening in on contestation and debate; something crucial for countering 
monolithic claims from any quarter. 
 
Within this vast epic, the Rājadharmaparvan falls more obviously on the 
side of the tradition’s social teachings. Setting out the ruler’s duties towards his 
people and the people’s expectations of their ruler, it constitutes a forerunner of 
later attempts to conceptualise the relationship between the state and the 
individual. At the same time, however, it challenges any easy division into 
‘religious’ and ‘secular’ by firmly situating the king’s responsibility to provide 
systems of governance (a ‘secular’ concern) within the broader universe of 
dharma: the complex ‘religious’ notion of social, spiritual and cosmic well-being, 
of which the king’s own dharma (here more readily translated as ‘duty’) is just 
one part. Although staying within the confines of the Rājadharmaparvan sets up 
a rather arbitrary division between models and narratives of kingship found 
across the spread of both Indian epics, it also usefully delimits an arena in which 
the issues can be explored in depth. Finally, in a political climate within India 
where, as Veena Das has noted, ‘to inherit any Hindu texts ha[s] become a very 
difficult task’ (2012, xi), this is a topic and a text that has been particularly 
compromised: Gurcharan Das’s description of the horror of his secular friends 
when he proposes studying the Mahābhārata is testament to that (2009, xxxv).10 
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Anything it contains for contesting the exclusionary ‘saffronisation’ of a rich and 
plural textual tradition will therefore be especially valuable.  
 
Before turning to the text itself, it will be helpful to briefly consider what 
one might reasonably expect to find there. It is worth stating at the outset that 
this will not include evidence of actual human rights: these form a framework for 
ethical discourse that is essentially a product of the modern world, as most 
theorists would agree. However, this framework is composite: it brings together 
a ‘bundle’ of different elements which can be disaggregated into its constituent 
parts in a way that is particularly useful for those seeking to further cross-
cultural debate.11 Some of these elements, especially the use of the language of 
rights as a way of articulating norms and values, are unlikely to be found in any 
pre-modern intellectual tradition. This means that ideas contained in the 
Rājadharmaparvan, as in any text of its age, whatever its cultural background, 
are likely to be expressed as duties towards others (specifically the duties of the 
king towards his subjects, as the title suggests), rather than set out as rights to 
be claimed.12  
 
Other elements, however, could still be sought within the confines of this 
discourse; particularly those concerning the substance of human rights: the 
safeguards for human dignity and welfare they enshrine. These would include, 
most crucially, provision for a fair and open legal system; freedom from arbitrary 
imprisonment or death; freedom to own property; freedom of movement, belief 
and expression; protection for the individual from harm by others. They could 
also include some of the areas covered by ‘positive rights’ - support for the 
needy and vulnerable; the fostering of an environment where people can thrive 
and prosper – as well as safeguards for human dignity and welfare in times of 
war. Some of the fundamental principles underlying human rights might also be 
looked for, although again expressed rather differently and stripped of features 
pertaining to the modern age. These could include the principle of universality – 
that these safeguards are open to all, ‘without distinction of any kind,’ in the 
words of the Universal Declaration; as well as the sense of an underlying 
common humanity: the idea that ‘all members of Homo sapiens are in some 
important sense equally human beings,’ as Donnelly puts it (2013, 70). Finally, it 
is worth reiterating that, as is the case with any of the historical sources usually 
cited as ‘foundational,’ up to and including the American Declaration of 
Independence, this 2000 year old text is bound to contain areas that are 
problematic: the critical point is to ensure a culturally level playing field in 
dealing with them. 
 
The substantive issues: safeguards and provisions for welfare 
The Rājadharmaparvan is found in Book 12 of the Mahābhārata and 
constitutes part of the teaching given by the elder statesman Bhīṣma while he 
lies dying. It takes place at the end of a great war that had decimated an entire 
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generation of rulers and its aim, in part, is to persuade the victorious but ascetic-
minded king, Yudhiṣṭhira, to take up the mantel of kingship with its necessary 
cruelties; a context that Fitzgerald explores at length in his introduction to the 
text (2004, 98-142). However, the Rājadharmaparvan represents more than 
simply an attempt at persuasion, or even the reconciliation of conflicting values. 
The battle is depicted as the necessary cleansing of a world oppressed by rulers 
who failed to behave correctly, while Yudhiṣṭhira is the dharmarāja - the king 
who rules by, or embodies, dharma; a title that he shares with the historical 
Aśoka whose impact on the epic’s ideology of kingship was profound.13 Rooted 
as they may be in the historical circumstances of the time, however, Bhīṣma’s 
teachings, as presented in the narrative, essentially constitute a blueprint for an 
ideal society, under an ideal ruler, set out on a slate wiped clean by war.   
 
Working from the premise that ‘a kingdom is a vast system, hard to hold 
together for one whose mind is not properly trained’ (58.21),14 Bhīṣma proceeds 
to tell Yudhiṣṭhira everything he needs to know in order to rule. The 
Rājadharmaparvan is the first of four lengthy sets of instruction, and it ranges in 
scope from practical details - how to design cities, manage the economy, wage 
military campaigns - to advice on political expedience and the murky dealings of 
realpolitik, including the use of spies, disinformation and spin. Some of the 
topics, however, clearly represent more than advice on effective governance for 
kings. Beyond the text, the voices we hear in Bhīṣma’s words are the voices of 
the epic’s redactors: brahmins certainly, keen to protect their position in society, 
as Fitzgerald points out (2004, 140), but also subjects, acutely aware of the 
power of the king. In presenting their vision of the perfect ruler they are also 
presenting their vision of the perfectly governed society. As Fitzgerald says, this 
and the following sections of Bhīṣma’s teachings represent a comprehensive 
basis for living ‘a Good Life in a Good Society in a Good Polity’ (2004, 79). 
 
Before considering how the king’s duties translated into the everyday 
detail of subjects’ lives, it is worth pointing out that the Rājadharmaparvan is a 
lengthy and openly composite text. Not all the voices it contains agree on every 
topic: some are harsher than others, some sound a more cynical note, some 
unashamedly pursue self-interest. Moreover, as is the case for most sources from 
which antecedents for human rights are drawn, the vision of governance it 
presents is authoritarian, paternalistic and sometimes ruthless. People’s lives 
were more controlled than would be acceptable today; social strata more firmly 
demarcated. This means that almost any of the longer passages from which the 
points below are taken will contain notes that jar. Although those cited have 
been sifted out of this rather muddier context they are by no means 
unrepresentative. Within these confines, and amongst these sometimes 
dissonant voices, there is broad agreement as to the safeguards and support law 
abiding citizens should be afforded, and where this is not the case it has been 
noted. Except in the case of direct quotations, the multiple textual references 
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supporting each of the different points have been gathered together into 
footnotes.  
 
The overarching duty of the king was to protect, guard and prosper his 
kingdom, enabling it to thrive physically, socially and economically. The king was 
charged with protecting his kingdom from those who threatened from without - 
most typically dasyus, barbarians who are themselves a potent symbol of the 
chaos he is guarding against – and also those who threatened from within: 
criminals who oppress law-abiding citizens with theft and violence. He does the 
first through military strength; the second through judicial procedure and 
punishment. Based on the amount of space devoted to it, provision of a judicial 
system that was effective, fair and impartial was by far the most important 
concern for the citizens who compiled the Rājadharmaparvan, driven by the 
desire for a safe environment in which people could go about their lawful 
business, secure in the knowledge that crime was kept in check. The text 
repeatedly states that people should not have to fear theft, violence or 
oppression by their fellows; a security for the vulnerable that is the very mark of 
civilization, contrasted with the ‘law of the fishes’ that prevails in its absence.15 
When a society is governed properly, people should be able to move around the 
kingdom as safely as children in their father’s house and enjoy the simple 
pleasures of life knowing they are safe.16 As the ultimate symbol of this security, 
in a properly governed kingdom a woman decked out in gold should be able to 
lie drunk and insensible in the street without fear of being robbed or molested.17  
 
The need for systems of punishment – daṇḍa, literally ‘rod/stick’ - to 
enforce the law is recognized, but the text is careful to surround them with 
constraints: it seeks to ensure the king himself does not become, as Badrinath 
puts it, ‘the biggest fish of all’ (2006, 425). The king should grasp the rod of 
daṇḍa firmly but he should be gentle in his use of it. Punishment should not be 
unduly harsh and neither should it be arbitrary or haphazard. It should only be 
applied according to the law and more serious punishments, such as banishment 
or execution, should not be used lightly.18 One passage prohibits the torture of 
even the king’s enemies.19 Judicial procedure should be careful, open and 
scrupulously honest, with a lengthy passage at 86.6-18 setting out directions for 
this. Here it is stated that the king should consider cases in the presence of eight 
officials, including four brahmins and three śūdras, the highest and lowest 
strands of society respectively. Trials should be held openly and defendants 
should be present and allowed legal representation. Judgements arrived at 
should be publicly displayed and miscarriages of justice are strongly condemned. 
Some of these points are reiterated elsewhere in the text and the need for 
impartiality, in relation to both procedures and those who implement them, is 
strongly emphasised. No one was to be considered above the law: not even the 
king’s parents, wife or priest should expect to escape punishment if they 
transgressed it.20 The text has more to say on all these points, and they are also 
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documented at length elsewhere in the textual corpus and the secondary 
literature relating to it.21  
 
After a fair and well-administered judicial system, the second most 
pressing concern for the text’s redactors was the protection of subjects’ property 
from unlawful or excessive taxation. While the need for taxation was fully 
accepted – it constituted part of the agreement between subjects and king - it 
was only to be levied at the lawful rate and used for the good of the country and 
its people: the king who taxes his subjects but fails to protect them is called a 
thief.22 Taxes should not be so high as to deter people from working, for, 
expressed in the imagery of husbandry the redactors were so fond of, ‘he who… 
cuts open the cow’s udder gets no milk’ (72.16).23 Other than through lawful 
taxation, people’s property should not be seized by the state and neither should 
their possessions be harmed.24  
 
The idea that the king’s right to levy taxes was dependant upon using 
them for the good of the kingdom takes the material into areas covered by 
positive rights in contemporary thinking. The king was charged with materially 
furthering the welfare and prosperity of his people; he must know ‘how to spend 
money as well as acquire it’ (66.6). This included grants for public works, such as 
the maintenance of buildings, roads and water supplies, and support for subjects 
during times of famine or crisis. A passage at 87.6-10 gives a broader picture of 
a society undergirded by the king that is one of industry, material comfort, and 
thriving religious and cultural activity.25 The king’s particular responsibility 
towards the poor and vulnerable is repeatedly emphasised: he should ‘wipe away 
the tears of the poor, the helpless, and the old’ (92.34); ‘bend down to the 
wretched’ (137.101); ‘have compassion for all beings, deliver and protect the 
dejected and broken’ (64.26). The practical manifestations of this should take the 
form of jobs and subsistence for the poor, as well as provision for widows, 
unmarried women and girls.26  
 
The need to establish safeguards for both non-combatants and soldiers in 
the event of war is another topic covered at some length; an anticipation of 
ideas of jus in bello in European texts about which much more could be said.27 
The king should make provision for his own civilians when preparing for defence, 
and refrain from causing unnecessary suffering to those of his enemy when 
attacking.28 In victory he should be merciful, ‘showing kindness to even babies in 
the womb’ (34.32). Those who surrender should not be killed, and neither should 
children, women and old men, while in another verse the king is told to protect 
refugees ‘as if they were his own children’ (92.32).29 The text is also particularly 
strong on setting out rules for combat, some of which come very close to 
contemporary norms.  The use of certain weapons is prohibited - poisoned or 
barbed arrows are deemed ‘weapons of the evil’ (96.11) - and stipulations are 
made for the treatment of enemy soldiers: those wounded should receive 
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medical treatment; those who throw down their weapons should not be harmed; 
those taken captive should be released after a period of time.30  
 
Many of these points occur in a lengthy section on ethical warfare 
(chapters 96-103). This usefully debunks the easy dismissal of classical Indian 
rules for warfare as formulaic ideals, rather than genuine normative principles for 
actual combat, by including such practical details as the most effective weapons 
to use in different situations, the best weather in which to attack, and the terrain 
best suited to different sections of the army.31 A clear distinction is made 
between rules pertaining to warfare between ‘the strictly honourable’ (96.12), 
which could be read as idealised, and those which are ‘expedient’ (101.2); 
instructions that ‘squeeze the rules of proper conduct’ (101.1), intended for use 
against the worst of enemies – barbarians without any moral principles.32 Even in 
the latter case, however, some basic normative standards apply: soldiers who 
are dying, starving, fleeing or clearly defeated (amongst other considerations) 
should never be attacked.33 The text states several times that war should always 
be a last resort, undertaken only when all other options have been explored, and 
there is a statement that could be read as an injunction against genocide: even 
in the case of barbarians, the principal ‘hated other’ of the text, slaughtering 
without leaving a remnant of survivors to carry on the line is strongly 
condemned.34 Several of these points are highly significant in terms of claims 
regarding historical antecedents and I shall return to them below. 
 
In addition to these major topics of concern, the text also touches on 
other issues of importance for human rights. Although there is little direct 
engagement with freedom of speech or movement, there are a number of 
references that relate to these topics tangentially. Freedom of movement within 
the kingdom was certainly expected; indeed it was one of the things that the rule 
of a king protected. Freedom to leave a kingdom that was badly ruled or afflicted 
by disaster is also suggested, with one reference stating that a subject would be 
stupid not to do so.35 The issue of freedom of speech is more complex. Those 
who denied the Veda (nāstika) were not tolerated, and the king is told to punish 
or imprison those who do so in several places, although this may well have been 
a largely rhetorical swipe at Buddhism, one of the ‘unacknowledged “ideological 
enem[ies]”’ (Hiltebeitel 2011, 193) with which the text engages.36 Another 
passage, however, urges a king to support all holy men, whatever sectarian 
marks they wear, and the boundaries of religious and philosophical thought in 
ancient India were extremely wide.37 The text also states that it is the king who 
enables the harmonious co-existence of groups with ‘different observances [and] 
customs’ (104.31-2), something identified as one of his most difficult 
accomplishments.  
 
The situation regarding participation in government and the people’s 
sanctions against misuse of power by the king is complex and another topic to 
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which much greater space could be afforded. While the main form of governance 
in the text is an absolute monarchy, there is some indication that the king was, 
at least theoretically, accountable to his people. Germs of this idea can be found 
in one of the text’s two charter myths for kingship (67.18-31), where the 
primordial king takes control at the people’s request, with a strong sense of 
contractual agreement in the arrangement, ruling with a power and splendour 
gained from them: ‘March out to victory, blazing like the sun!... Our dharmic 
deeds will always conquer!’ (67.28).38 They can also be found in etymologies that 
derive ‘king’ – rājan – from √rañj – ‘be pleased with’: one states that ‘the 
designation “king” arose from the people’s affection’ (29.131), and leaves open 
the possibility that when this affection is removed, so too might be the title. 
Other passages reiterate this, with some making a move from accountability to 
revolt that is historically significant.39  One which urges the king to win his 
subjects’ hearts also says that a dishonest or greedy ruler ‘is quickly set aside by 
his own people’ (57.27); another that ‘even his own people do not tolerate’ a 
king who allows his men to behave badly (94.3). Another passage takes this 
further, stating quite explicitly that a king who employs evil counsellors ‘should 
be slain by the people’ (93.9); a violent removal of an unworthy king that also 
finds echoes in the other charter myth at 59.13-140.40 Certainly, the deeply 
symbiotic nature of the relationship between king and subjects is emphasised 
throughout and the king who forgets this and treats his people wrongly ‘chops 
into his own self, like an axe splitting a tree’ (95.8). 
 
By now it should be apparent that much of what was being sought in this 
classical Indian discussion of people’s lives within the state can be found, albeit 
expressed in a discourse of the duties of the king. The areas of life the text is 
most concerned with – a fair and open system of justice; checks to the king’s 
claim on his subjects’ property; help for the poor and vulnerable; the 
maintenance of a material and social infrastructure within which agriculture, 
commerce and culture can thrive; protection from the horrors of war – all have 
considerable overlap with many of the issues addressed by human rights. The 
inhabitant of a state ruled by the standards set out in the Rājadharmaparvan 
would be protected against miscarriage of justice or unfair trail, against arbitrary 
imprisonment, death or banishment. His or, quite explicitly, her property and 
person would be secure against harm by the state or other individuals. He or, 
again quite explicitly, she could expect help from the state in times of hardship, 
protection in times of war. People would be provided with an environment in 
which their endeavours could be expected to flourish, have freedom of 
movement, and reasonable freedom of expression. They would also have some 
precedent for challenging the legitimacy of a ruler who did not safeguard these 
things. While the extent to which these principles were put into practice may be 
open to discussion (although there is certainly historical evidence to suggest that 
some of them were),41 this is no less true of the standards set out in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as Thapar noted some time ago (1966, 
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31). The point is that this early Indian blue-print for the well-run state provides a 
vision of conditions required for the dignity and welfare of its people that is 
remarkably close to that expressed in the substance of human rights today.  
 
This is valuable in itself. It adds to the pluralisation of historical narratives 
for the substantive issues and it begins to engage with the claims being 
evaluated. Nothing has been found so far to support the argument that Hinduism 
is distinctively incompatible with human rights, while the stereotyping of Indian 
ethical norms as spiritual, with its sotto voce ‘merely,’ is substantially undermined 
by discussions of normative principles for ethical warfare in a context as far 
removed from the ‘spiritual’ as it is possible to be: dirty tactics to defeat a savage 
enemy. Some of the material also begins to engage with more specific historical 
claims, although there was insufficient space to examine these in detail. 
Stipulations regarding the treatment of refugees, the captured, and the defeated 
come very close to those found in the early modern works of Gentili and Grotius, 
who are seen by many as landmark figures in the movement towards human 
rights: Gentili for his ‘innovative doctrine’ (James 2007, 11) that refugees should 
be granted asylum; Grotius for his ‘visionary’ (Bring 2006, 138) principles of 
humanitarian treatment for captured soldiers and civilians.42 The suggestion that 
subjects might themselves depose an unjust ruler, rather than relying on a God 
or gods to do so, begins to approach the idea of a right to revolt; something 
Donnelly has argued to be absent from pre-modern sources in general, and 
others have reiterated in the specific context of ancient India.43 
  
However, two significant questions still remain. Firstly, were these 
provisions and safeguards universal to all, or were they only in place for certain 
privileged sections of society? Secondly, is there any indication that others were 
denied them because they were seen as somehow less than human? In other 
words is there any equivalence to the key principles of universality and common 
humanity? These questions are particularly important to these debates. While 
many would concede that the substantive elements of human rights can be 
found fairly widely, fewer would accept that the same is true of the principles: it 
is the perception of their absence outside the intellectual traditions of Europe 
that fuels claims such as Headley’s, and it is the perception of their absence in 
traditional Hinduism, more specifically, that forms the core of arguments 
concerning incompatibility. Any attempt at addressing these questions leads 
inevitably to the issue of caste: a topic on which the need to ‘negotiate the 
spaces’ is at its most acute.  
 
The principles: universality and common humanity 
It will be helpful to begin by reiterating three things by way of delineating 
what these spaces are. Firstly, that many aspects of caste, in both its textual and 
practical manifestations, are undeniably incompatible with human rights; any 
discussion that wants to seriously engage with the theoretical literature needs to 
 13 
acknowledge this. Secondly, that recognition of these problems is no more the 
‘Gift of the West,’ to use Baxi’s phrase again, than are human rights themselves: 
they have been subject to internal contestation and discussion for millennia. 
Several debates concerning varṇa can be traced within the Mahābhārata, and 
these continue to inform more recent attempts to separate what some value in 
the system (particularly its vision of society as an organic whole) from aspects 
that any progressive reading must agree are problematic.44 Thirdly, discussing 
these issues across a level playing field – something fundamental to Taylor’s 
‘presumption of equal worth’ (1994, 72) which most deem necessary for any 
meaningful cross-cultural debate – requires not only bringing to the text a similar 
awareness of complexity, context and polyphony routinely applied to European 
sources, but also similar criteria for evaluation.  It is a very obvious point, but 
one often overlooked, that a society built around inequality and caste divisions in 
ancient India should be compared historically with societies built around 
inequality and slavery in ancient and pre-20th Century Europe and America, 
rather than with contemporary norms. It is quite possible to argue this without 
condoning human rights abuses associated with caste today.  
 
Social division in the Rājadharmaparvan (and the Mahābhārata as a 
whole) was mainly according to the fourfold system of varṇa, with brahmins at 
one end and śūdras at the other.45 Groups of people outside the varṇa system 
are also known, including caṇḍālas (seen by many as an early form of those later 
deemed ‘untouchable’), Niṣādas and other tribal peoples, as well as the more 
loosely defined dasyus: barbarians and foreigners against whom, to some extent, 
Āryan society defined itself. Varṇa is absolutely fundamental to the text: the king 
is repeatedly enjoined to maintain the varṇas in their proper order; keep the 
people within them to their appropriate duties (varṇadharma); and stop the 
mixture of varṇas through marriage (varṇasaṃkara), something seen as one of 
the great evils that befall a barbarised society.46 Moreover, statements to this 
effect are made in the same passages that cover many of the issues considered 
above: being kept within one’s varṇa, and being made to follow the duties 
appropriate to it, is as much a part of the ‘Good Life in a Good Society in a Good 
Polity’ as a just judicial system, fair taxation, and a well maintained material 
environment.47 The varṇas are not presented as socially equal in status, an 
inequality reflected in a system of privileges at the top and a set of restrictions at 
the bottom.48 Although the text’s treatment of these issues (and the varṇa 
system as a whole) is more complex than this brief summary suggests,49 these 
inequalities, along with the restrictions on marriage and occupation concomitant 
to them, would of course be problematic in terms of contemporary human rights; 
although, to reiterate, the same is no less true of features found in other 
historical sources widely included amongst their antecedents.50  
 
On the crucial issue of how far within society the safeguards for dignity 
and welfare extended, however, although there may have been additional 
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benefits for some groups, there is no indication that śūdras, the lowest social 
stratum the Rājadharmaparvan treats in any detail, were excluded from the 
major provisions outlined above. Nowhere is it said that access to a fair, impartial 
and properly conducted legal system was restricted to the upper varṇas; indeed, 
there is every indication that it was not: as we saw, three śūdras were included 
in the list of those who should consider judicial proceedings.51 Neither is there 
anything to indicate that śūdras were excluded from the general injunction that 
the king should protect and prosper his subjects. Again, the fact that they were 
not is made explicit: the king should be compassionate ‘to the four varṇas’ 
(56.36); he should regard favourably ‘all the varṇas’ (57.30).52 Whatever social 
restrictions and inequalities undoubtedly existed, therefore, there is no evidence, 
in this text at least, that these inequalities affected the safeguards set in place as 
basic requirements for human welfare within the state. 
 
The notion of a common humanity is more complex, both in terms of what 
the idea entails and also what might constitute evidence for it in this and other 
historical sources. For the purposes of the debates at hand, however, the most 
basic question can be framed as follows: is there any evidence to suggest that all 
members of the human species are, to repeat Donnelly’s definition, ‘in some 
important sense equally human beings’ (2013, 70)? This is the idea that Donnelly 
stated to be fundamentally alien to Hinduism in his earlier work, and it is this 
understanding of common humanity that Headley and others have claimed to be 
uniquely European in provenance. Because Donnelly has not revisited this aspect 
of his assessment of Hinduism, which has proved rather influential, it is worth 
considering in a little detail.53 There were two main aspects to his claim. The first 
is that, ‘As we saw in the case of Hindu India, some societies have not even 
recognized “human being” as a descriptive category’ (2003, 91). The second is 
that ‘in many ways the difference between high castes and low castes is greater 
than that between lower castes and animals’ (2003, 83). These add up to two 
separate but closely related points: a) that there is no sense of a common 
human identity; b) those at the bottom end of the social scale are not considered 
equally human in terms of either their intrinsic nature or the way in which they 
should be treated.  
 
The first is the most straightforward and the easiest to address. The 
Rājadharmaparvan certainly does know ‘human being’ as a descriptive category. 
It has several words for it and uses these to clearly differentiate humans from 
other categories of living beings: gods and other celestial beings on the one 
hand and, more importantly for Donnelly’s second point, animals on the other. 
Thus, to give just two examples from several, Brahmā is said to have created 
gods, demons, humans (manuṣya) and serpents (121.55), while farmers are said 
to sustain the gods, ancestors, humans (manuṣya), and animals (90.24).54 More 
significantly, another verse states that what makes a being human is an 
acceptance of maryāda – moral laws, limits, frameworks: without these, humans 
 15 
(manuṣya) become like beasts (paśubhūta) (65.7). The Rājadharmaparvan, of 
course, is not alone amongst Indian texts in knowing ‘human’ as a category, and 
it is worth pointing out that references showing a clear distinction between 
humans and animals can also be found in the Manusmṛti, a text which Donnelly 
draws on to reinforce his argument.55 Clearly, then, the contention that the 
tradition has no conceptual category corresponding to ‘human’ is simply wrong.   
  
Taking up the issue of how widely this category extended, the sense of a 
common human identity irrespective of status emerges in a number of different 
ways in the text. At one end of the social scale, it comes across very clearly in 
the first of the text’s two charter myths for kingship mentioned above, where it 
could not be emphasised more graphically that the king is the same as his 
subjects ‘in all the characteristics of mankind - samaḥ sarvaguṇair nr̥ṇām’: he 
has ‘the same pains and pleasures; the same back, arms and belly; the same 
semen, bones and marrow… he breathes in and out the same…’; a sense of 
commonality brought home by the repeated use of tulya – ‘of like kind’ in the 
description (59.6-7). More significantly, at the other end of the social scale, the 
important verse cited above in which all those with maryāda are identified as 
human (65.7) is followed further on in the same passage by one that applies the 
description mānava – another word for ‘human’ – to even the quintessential 
barbarian outsiders, dasyus (65.23). Indeed, the passage uses the same term at 
the end of a long list of every possible race of barbarous foreigner (mleccha) 
who might live in a kingdom: they are, ‘in their entirety,’ mānava, with the term 
also including those from all four varṇas (65.14).56 These verses are part of a 
discussion about how a king can ensure that all the people in the kingdom, 
including barbarians, conform to dharma. The answer is that there are basic 
norms of behaviour for everyone - sarvalokasya (65.22). These include paying 
respect to elders, providing for one’s family, and practising virtues such as non-
injury, truthfulness and suppression of anger: virtues which elsewhere in the text 
are identified as sanātana dharma – always and everywhere applicable.57  
 
Just beyond the Rājadharmaparvan, a discussion early in the 
Āpaddharmaparvan reiterates these common standards, coming back to the idea 
that the salient distinguishing feature is awareness of fundamental moral 
boundaries – maryāda. Again it sets this within the context of barbarians, in 
particular those ‘fierce and pitiless’ dasyus who may be used in a king’s army for 
‘undertaking frightful deeds’ (131.10-11), stating that even such as these will 
censure certain deeds and fear the lack of moral boundaries.58 The passage then 
moves on to the verse cited above as a condemnation of genocide: even if these 
people are still considered barbarians despite the fact they shun these deeds, it 
is nevertheless ‘the fixed opinion that they should not be slaughtered without 
leaving a remnant’ (131.16-17).  In other words, the humanity of barbarians 
extends to both capabilities (basic moral awareness) and what is due to them: 
even if they are barbarians they should not be eradicated without trace.  
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The emphasis has been on the status of barbarians for two reasons. In 
terms of Donnelly’s argument, recognition of the common humanity of dasyus – 
the members of the human race arguably at furthest remove from those at the 
top of the varṇa system – must call into question his statement that this is not 
the case for those lower down the caste system (although I am mindful of the 
force of Sathaye’s distinction between ‘[o]utcaste and outsider’ 2015, 101). 
Certainly, in the case of śūdras, the lowest group the Rājadharmaparvan 
discusses in any detail, not only are they explicitly identified as mānava in the 
verse already cited (65.14), there is every indication that elsewhere their 
humanity was simply taken for granted, as their inclusion within the basic 
safeguards listed above suggests. From the evidence here, therefore, whatever 
other problems varṇa might involve, considering those at the bottom of the 
system to be less than human does not seem to be among them. 
 
The second reason is that it is precisely this extension of common 
humanity to ‘even barbarians’ that has been claimed as historically unique to 
Europe. Headley, for example, in forwarding the argument that ‘the early 
identification of the idea of humanity as a single moral collectivity’ was a ‘unique 
feature of Western civilization’ (200, 63), cites Cicero for the idea that common 
humanity should be extended to barbarians (2008, 64), along with the 16th 
century Jesuit Las Casas for the recognition that ‘All the peoples of the world are 
humans and there is only one definition of all humans… that is that they are 
rational’ (2008, 78). Others have variously credited Vitoria, another Jesuit, as the 
person ‘who first expressed the idea that “barbarous” peoples too must be 
considered equal members of the universal human community’ (Johnston 2008, 
110), or ‘human rights visionaries’ such as Grotius and Descartes for ‘affirming a 
common humanity that transcended religious sectarianism’ (Ishay 2008, 78). It is 
not the examples given but the nature of the claims – ‘unique,’ ‘first,’ ‘visionaries’ 
– that is the problem here. While it is natural that those constructing historical 
narratives for human rights will draw on the intellectual heritage with which they 
are most familiar, the assumption that the building blocks for what Ignatieff has 
called ‘the lingua franca of global moral thought’ (2001, 53) will not be found 
outside of this, is hard to read as anything other than, at best, blatantly 
Eurocentric or, at worst, in Baxi’s words: ‘overt epistemic racism’ (2012, 45-6).  
 
Conclusion: negotiating the spaces 
This has been a long and rather detailed textual study, but one of the 
points being emphasised is that this is the level of engagement necessary across 
the board for meaningful cross-cultural debate. It set out to investigate a 
number of arguments found in the theoretical literature, and it will be useful to 
briefly summarise what was established in relation to these before proceeding 
further. The first argument centred on the issue of whether this small but fairly 
representative ‘slice’ of the tradition’s texts supported the lingering sense that 
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Hinduism is distinctively incompatible with human rights, or India’s historical 
discussions of polity problematic in a way that is not the case with those 
antecedents more widely considered ‘foundational.’ The evidence suggests it 
does not. The safeguards and provisions set out in the Rājadharmaparvan 
showed broad agreement with those encapsulated by human rights, and there 
was no evidence that certain sectors of society were excluded from these by 
virtue of social status or gender. Crucially, despite the text’s emphasis on the 
importance of varṇa, there was nothing that lent credence to the claim that 
those at the bottom of the system were seen as less than human; still less that 
‘human’ as a category simply did not exist. Humans were distinguished from 
animals by the existence of a basic moral awareness, and this applied 
irrespective of social status or even, with the inclusion of dasyus, distinctions 
corresponding to religion and race. This is not, of course, to say that other voices 
in the tradition then or now might not have put forward different arguments. 
However, if Headley can assert that ‘the very complexity and polyphony of the 
European intellectual context’ ensured those voices asserting a common 
humanity were never entirely lost, even during the growing racism of the colonial 
period (2008, 78), the same is no less true here. 
 
The second point at issue was whether the text contained anything to 
counter broader claims that antecedents for human rights are found primarily, or 
evenly exclusively, in the intellectual histories of Europe. Here there was 
evidence suggesting it does. As well as challenging the claims regarding the 
extension of a common humanity to ‘even barbarians’ just discussed, material 
was found that served to undermine several others, particularly in the section 
dealing with stipulations for humanitarian warfare. It is worth restating that the 
Rājadharmaparvan is only one of a number of texts where ideas such as these 
may be found. Other studies have discussed notions of jus in bello across a wider 
range of Indian sources, as mentioned above, while a broader trawl of the 
Mahābhārata itself yields further avenues that could be fruitfully explored in 
relation to the notion of a common humanity.  
 
Although the primary focus up to now has been engaging with these 
debates within the theoretical literature, it is impossible to conclude without also 
briefly considering ways in which this might interact unhelpfully with debates 
elsewhere. The need to challenge Eurocentric readings of intellectual history in 
one direction, without playing into agendas inimical to human rights in another, 
is something that applies across a range of cultures. In the political climate of 
contemporary India, however, any attempt to find antecedents for human rights 
in formulations of ‘Hindu’ kingship involves a rather specific set of problems. 
Over the last few decades the rhetoric and symbolism of kingship has become 
strongly identified with the ideology of Hindu Nationalism (Hindutva), where it 
has been used, in particular, to further anti-minority agendas that have led to 
human rights abuses against India’s Muslim and other non-Hindu communities.  
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The role played by the narrative of Rāmrāj, the idealised rule of Rāma, in 
the Babri mosque campaign in Ayodhya, which led to waves of catastrophic 
communal violence in the 1990s, has been well documented.59 The term ‘Raj 
dharma,’ meanwhile, has become indelibly associated with the massacres that 
took place in Gujarat in 2002, when local Muslims were blamed for the death of 
Hindutva activists in a fire on a train at Godhra. The weeks of rioting and 
violence that ensued resulted in around a thousand, mainly Muslim, deaths, as 
well as the widespread destruction of homes and businesses. Both the BJP-led 
coalition that ruled the state, and its Chief Minister, Narendra Modi, were widely 
viewed as complicit in the actions leading to this.60 Announcing a rehabilitation 
package in the wake of the riots, the then Prime Minister, Atal Vajpayee, 
famously told Modi that he should ‘observe his “Raj dharma” without showing 
any discrimination… on the basis of caste, creed or religion’ (The Hindu, April 05, 
2002), to which Modi replied he was ‘exactly doing that.’ The phrase has 
subsequently ricocheted around the Indian press, alternately used to justify or 
condemn more recent actions by Modi (who became Prime Minister of India in 
2014) and the BJP at state and national level.61  
 
If the selective use of the tradition’s texts by the Hindu Right has made 
them toxic to progressive Indians in the way documented by Das and others, the 
reverberations from Vajpayee’s comment mean that any discussion of a text on 
rājadharma has to tread very carefully indeed. Many of the features of a study 
such as this, particularly its focus on what can be read as ‘Hindu’ kingship, on 
India’s ancient rather than medieval past, could all too easily resonate with the 
Hindutva ‘saffronisation’ of Indian history.62 It therefore needs to be made very 
clear that using a textual study of the Rājadharmaparvan to contest the claim 
that Hinduism is incompatible with human rights is not the same as defending 
the actions of those who have co-opted the rhetoric of kingship today. It also 
brings into even sharper focus the question of how one might negotiate the 
spaces between these problematic readings.  
 
The academic study of Hinduism has grappled with the problem posed by 
Hindutva for some time now, challenging its restrictive interpretations through a 
greater focus on subaltern histories, on the complex intellectual dialogues 
between the subcontinent’s different religious communities, and on the way that 
these, as well as the tradition’s inherent pluralism and diversity, are reflected in 
its texts. Some of the more recent debates within human rights theory also 
suggest strategies that may prove helpful. Along with a growing sense that any 
history of human rights, however broadly drawn, is essentially problematic, that 
they represent an idea that is better approached ‘sui generis’ (Beitz 2009, 197), 
as a radically new ethical framework to which ‘all nations come as strangers’ 
(Baxi 2012, 46), there has also been a move away from the paradigm of 
compatibility and the narrative of inherent opposition between religion and 
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human rights which fed into this. Both of these have been fuelled, in part, by a 
greater sensitivity to the influences still exerted by the legacy of Colonialism, 
along with the corresponding recognition that human rights might ‘“travel” 
better,’ in Taylor’s words (1999, 126) if their historical narratives and 
philosophical justifications were tied less closely to the intellectual traditions of 
Europe.  
 
These changing parameters bring a rather different set of questions to a 
text such as the Rājadharmaparvan; questions less to do with how its teachings 
might conform to human rights, or accord with their notional histories, and more 
to do with the resources it might provide for furthering their reception, helping to 
furnish them with ‘origin myths’ (Baxi 2012, 199) that will better foster their 
‘vernacularization’ (Merry 2006, 39) within a variety of cultural backgrounds. For 
Hunt, these questions might revolve around channels for emotional resonance 
similar to those that enabled ‘equality of rights [to] become a “self-evident” truth 
in such unlikely places’ as 18th century France and America (2007, 19); for 
Taylor, ‘the ideals, the notions of human excellence, the rhetorical tropes and 
reference points by which these norms become objects of deep commitment’ 
(1999, 136); for Baxi, ways in which the text might ‘configure the notion of what 
it mean[s] to be human’ (2012, 47). These arguments are complex and it is 
impossible to do justice to them here. For the purpose of concluding this enquiry 
a much simpler question can be posed: how may the text be used to challenge 
rather than endorse those who condone or justify abuses?  
 
That the rhetoric of ‘Raj dharma’ has proved to be a two-edged sword is 
obvious from its use in the Indian media. There is, however, nothing new in this. 
The words put into Bhīṣma’s mouth were intended to instruct but also to pass 
judgement; a function made obvious by passages where the description of a 
country governed according to the principles of rājadharma is contrasted with 
one where this is not the case: visions of brutish chaos where all restraints break 
down and people ‘tear each other to pieces like dogs a lump of flesh’ (122.21), 
where ‘the strong roast the weak on a spit, like fish’ (67.16).63 When the text is 
understood, therefore, not so much as the representation of a glorious Hindu 
past, as Hindutva rhetoric would present it, but as a set of norms against which 
those in power can be judged, there is much in Bhīṣma’s teachings that can 
sharpen the edge of the sword turned towards insurrection. Rather than 
describing how a kingdom was, these statements specify how it should be. If the 
ruler of a state performs his ‘Raj dharma’ women will be safe from harm; the 
vulnerable protected from injury by others; potentially conflicting groups 
supported in harmonious co-existence; the ‘broken’ given help. If they are not, 
Bhīṣma’s teachings provide a weapon for challenging the government in 
question. Those deemed wanting might find, like kings who fail to win their 
subjects’ approval, that they must be ‘prepared to use [their] shoes’ (129.13).   
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Returning to Vajpayee’s use of the term and the events that precipitated 
it, the text contains much to put the lie to Modi’s claim to be ‘exactly doing that.’ 
Not only do the many beautiful metaphors for the ruler’s responsibilities towards 
his people – he should ‘nurture his subjects like a mother’ (137.101); devote 
himself to their welfare ‘as a pregnant woman to her unborn child’ (56.44-5) – 
highlight the extent to which the state fell short, they do so in a way that taps 
into the emotive empathy that sits at the heart of human rights. Most visceral of 
all in this regard is the disturbing resonance between the horrors of a failing 
kingdom and eyewitness accounts of the carnage in Gujarat.64 While elements of 
the text’s descriptions can, and always could, serve to support other agendas, 
this resonance, again, shows how the sword may cut both ways.   
 
Even this very brief discussion should make it clear why the shift towards 
a paradigm of reception and resource is so useful. When the Rājadharmaparvan 
is interrogated as this shift suggests, any evidence it yields to counter claims that 
human rights are fundamentally alien to Hinduism from without, at the same 
time constitutes a resource for those challenging abuses from within. To argue 
that Hinduism is compatible with human rights, that those at the bottom of the 
social scale were clearly seen as human in this much vaunted exposition of Hindu 
kingship, does not endorse those who commit abuses in its name, it challenges 
them. Conversely, failing to contest these negative readings of the tradition 
within global debates only serves to perpetuate a process that Taylor calls ‘self-
reinforcing’ when he says, ‘The more the outside portrayal… comes across as a 
blanket condemnation of or contempt for the tradition, the more the dynamic of 
a “fundamentalist” resistance to all redefinition tends to get in train’ (1999, 140). 
These shifting parameters are particularly effective when brought to the struggle 
against Hindu Nationalism. They permit the acknowledgment of the postcolonial 
criticism it contains, while challenging those aspects hostile to human rights, 
through the use of resources that are incontrovertibly ‘swadeshi’ - home grown 
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1 Donnelly’s third edition of his influential Universal Human Rights in Theory and 
Practice covers a broader range of features, giving more emphasis to the 
tradition’s diversity and malleability (2013, 147-158).   
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2 Freeman, for example, lists Jewish, Christian, Muslim and Buddhist beliefs as 
part of the ‘broader and deeper moral ideas, such as those of justice and human 
dignity, that are found in many cultures’ (2005, 152) but makes no mention of 
Hinduism. Griffin, likewise, references Islam, Buddhism and Confucianism in a 
similar context but not Hinduism (2008, 138).  
3 Griffin’s arguments are rather subtler than this summary suggests. He makes 
the point as part of the important argument that it is a contemporary receptivity 
to human rights that matters, something on which Donnelly now concurs (2013, 
156).   
4 See for example: Thapar 1966; Mitra 1982; Sen 1997; Sharma 2003; Mehta 
2011. 
5 Some of the more recent examples would include: Mehta 2011, 202; Baxi 2012, 
178; Das 2009, 162.  
6 For its persistence, see, for example: Johnston, whose otherwise sympathetic 
approach to broader histories still refers to ‘the fatalism and other-worldliness of 
Hindu society’ (2008, 277). It is also notable that Griffin, who presents the 
stereotype in order to critique it, shifts from the initial use of ‘Hinduism’ when he 
presents it, to ‘India’ when he problematises it’ (2008, 140-1).  
7 For the other examples, see pp. 2, 7 and 217. 
8 Sen makes the point in relation to theories of justice, continuing with the 
equally understated: ‘There is nothing particularly odd in the recognition that 
similar intellectual engagements have taken place in different parts of the globe.’ 
Further on he argues, again in a way equally applicable to human rights, that the 
idea of notions such as democracy being ‘imposed’ on non-Western cultures ‘is 
extraordinarily inappropriate since it makes the implicit assumption  that 
democracy belongs exclusively to the West’ (2009, 322).  
9 For a recent discussion of the Aśokan Edicts and Kauṭilya’s Arthaśāstra in 
relation to human rights, see Rich 2010. The dating of Indian texts is highly 
contentious but the latest scholarly consensus currently places all the sources 
mentioned here within a roughly 500 year period, starting with the Edicts (mid 
3rd Century Before Common Era) and ending with the Arthaśāstra, previously 
linked with the reign of Candragupta Maurya in the 4th CBCE but now placed 
between 50 and 125 CE for the Kauṭilya Recension and 175 and 300 CE for the 
final Śāstric Redaction (Olivelle, 2013, 29, 31). The Rājadharmaparvan, as part of 
the Mahābhārata, falls within the first half of this span, around the mid 2nd to 
late 1st CBCE, along with the roughly contemporaneous Manusmṛti: see 
Hiltebeitel 2001, 17-21 and 2011, 11-20 for a longer discussion of the epic’s 
composition, and for the chronological proximity between it and the Manusmṛti, 
2011, 190-91, 197. All of these sources would have been drawing on 
considerably earlier material.  
10 Das’s concern that he ‘had to fear the intolerance of my ‘secular’ friends as 
much as the bigotry of the Hindu Right’ (2009, xxxv) is reflected in several of the 
articles in Doniger and Nussbaum 2015. Nussbaum, in particular, also notes that 
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for progressive liberals in India, ‘religion is profoundly unfashionable, almost 
unmentionable,’ because so widely identified with the ‘narrow sectarian version 
of Hinduism’ peddled by the Hindu right (Doniger and Nussbaum 2015, 52, 53). 
Kanjilal’s article in the same volume also highlights the need to reclaim the ‘no-
man’s land’ created by this polarization, so that ‘normal, unaggressive 
conservatives [might] be given their space back and allowed to make respectable 
homes there’ (Doniger and Nussbaum 2015, 241).  
11 As Sen, for example, seeks to do in relation to ideas of freedom, democracy 
and tolerance (1997, 15-17, 27). Rawls also does something similar in The Law 
of Peoples (1999), where he attempts to de-couple human rights (and the notion 
of ‘decent’ governance more broadly) from the particular values of liberal 
democracies. Arguing that ‘it is important to see that an agreement on a Law of 
Peoples [broadly, an international consensus on standards of justice] ensuring 
human rights is not an agreement limited only to liberal societies.’ (1999, 68), he 
posits the category of what he calls ‘decent hierarchical peoples’; possible non-
liberal societies that still pursue government for the common good and recognise 
the need for ‘urgent’ human rights to be protected. 
12 The relationship between rights and duties, although an important feature of 
some debates, is not something I propose to explore in any detail here. It 
should, however, be pointed out that some attempts have been made to find an 
equivalent to rights in the Indian idea of adhikāra, a word that occurs very rarely 
in the Rājadharmaparvan (57.6; 61.21) and not in a way that throws much light 
on the issue. For some of the discussions of rights and duties in Hinduism that 
mention adhikāra, see: Sharma 2003, 30-49 (he discusses adhikāra on p.36); 
Carmen 1988 (p.121 for adhikāra); Mitra 1982 (pp.78-80 for adhikāra).  
13 For discussion of the text’s historical background, see Fitzgerald 2004, 99-142. 
Fitzgerald reads the Rājadharmaparvan as an attempt to reassert a brāhmaṇya 
ideology of kingship following the patronage of Buddhism and Jainism by the 
Nanda and Maurya dynasties that ruled between the 4th and 2nd centuries BCE. 
He discusses the relations between Aśoka and Yudhiṣṭhira on pp.114-23, 129-30 
and, especially, 135-9. The profound effect that Aśoka’s adoption and adaptation 
of Buddhist dharma has had on the development of the subcontinent’s emerging 
religio-philosophical traditions has been discussed at length by Hiltebeitel, who 
likens it to ‘an anicut or great dam, toward which numerous Vedic and Buddhist 
tributaries must have flowed, gotten dammed up for a while and forced to 
intermingle, and from which they then overflowed, each with new vigor, as the 
two communities took the potent waters into new flows and channels of their 
own further devising’ (2011, 30). This, and the overlap between the norms of 
governance articulated in the Aśokan Edicts and the Rājadharmaparvan, 
additionally calls into question any overly rigid distinction between ‘Buddhism’ 
and ‘Hinduism’ at this stage of development and the way this sometimes plays 
out in discussions of human rights.  
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14 For those unfamiliar with the Mahābhārata, most systems of referencing are 
tripartite, designating book, chapter and verse (e.g. 12.58.21). However, as 
references here are from Book 12, I have simply given chapter and verse in the 
majority of cases. All references are to the Critical Edition of the Mahābhārata 
(Sukthankar et. al.: 1933-70) and all translations my own.   
15 For one of the many expressions of this see, for example, 68.14-19, 30-31 
which contrasts social conditions that prevail when the rule of law is firm with 
the chaos that ensues when it is absent.  
16  57.33 and 73.23-4, respectively.  
17 29.70, with a similar statement at 68.32.  
18 122.40-1: the passage lists censure, imprisonment, and fines as less serious 
ones. For other points mentioned here see: 57.29 (be gentle in the use of 
daṇḍa); 94.4, 95.9, 104.7 (condemnation of violent king); 71.7, 92.27 (punishing 
only those who deserve it).  
19  97.14 – although continuing, somewhat cynically, that torture is seldom 
effective. Another verse does, however, mention torturing to death those who 
attempt regicide (86.21). It is part of a passage that also, problematically, states 
the different social orders should receive different punishments (86.19-21).  
20 121.57. The point is also made at 32.6; 57.7; 92.31. For references to 
impartiality see: 65.5, 66.5, 121.10. Impartiality, honesty and suitable 
qualifications are deemed essential requirements for those holding positions of 
office: the king should not appoint ‘blockheads’ (72.9) simply because they are 
his cronies. For some of the many expressions of this see 84.1 and120.25-6; the 
former opening a lengthy description which illustrates the tension and 
relationship between the interests of the king and those of his subjects.   
21 For discussion of these topics in relation to other texts, see: Rich 2010, 68-93 
(Kauṭilya), 116-128 (Aśokan Edicts); Alexandrowicz 1965 (Kauṭilya); Scharfe 
1989, Part II (Kauṭilya); Menski 2007, 32-54 and Lingat 1973, 207-256 (both 
drawing on a variety of texts). The comprehensive studies of dharma and artha 
by Kane (1962-75) and Derrett (1968) also cover these topics.  
22 137.96, just beyond the Rājadharmaparvan. 72.10-11 is one of several 
references covering the other points and the idea of tax as part of a contract 
between people and king is found at 67.23, in the second charter myth discussed 
below. The most commonly mentioned rate of taxation is one sixth, as in 72.10.  
23 Instead, the text says more cynically, ‘he should suck the kingdom softly, like 
a leach’ (89.5). This is part of a lengthy discussion of taxation at 88.11ff.  
24 57.12, 72.13.  
25 For the other points mentioned here see: 68.5, 87.4 (prosperity and welfare); 
57.12,32, 58.8-9, 69.51 (grants and public projects); 128.30 (support during 
famine). 
26 57.19, 87.24, 94.27. The quotation from 137.10 is at the start of the 
Āpaddharmaparvan.  
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27 And, indeed, has been. For recent discussions of issues to do with jus in bello 
over a broader range of Indian texts, see, for example: Brekke 2005; Roy 2007 
(who engages with Brekke’s arguments); Allen 2006.  
28 See 69.33-4, 42, 54-7 for provisions when defending, with v.33 suggesting 
that these included the lowly, as well as the rich and powerful, and 104.39, 
where the king is enjoined not to damage essential infrastructures (following 
Fitzgerald’s discussion of the commentaries (2004, 748, note 1 on 104.39).  
29 The word used here is śāraṇika, an unusual word for ‘traveller.’ Fitzgerald 
translates it as ‘refugee’ and Ganguli as ‘one who seeks protection’ in its only 
other occurrence in the Mahābhārata (13.107.110). For sparing non-combatants, 
see 99.47, where I am following Fitzgerald’s arguments for substituting bāla for 
bala (2004, 745, note 1 on 99.47). The treatment of a conquered people is also 
discussed at 97.5-6, 11-12, 14, with the final verse including the prohibition on 
torture mentioned above.  
30 On these points see: 96.13 (medical treatment); 97.3 (not attacking one who 
capitulates); 96.13 and 97.4 (release of captured soldiers, with the reading of 
the second following Nīlakaṇṭha: see Fitzgerald 2004, 742, note 1 on 97.4.).  
31 For the assertion that these stipulations were not to be taken seriously see, for 
example, Bring 2006, 13, where he cites them as a manifestation of ‘Indian 
spirituality,’ concurring with an earlier writer that they would have had little 
significance for actual combat.  
32 101.2 usefully distinguishes between different types of rules/laws: some are 
established on truth (how things are); some on reasoned argument; some on the 
actions of the good; some on expedience - satyena hi sthitā dharmā upapattyā 
tathāpare / sādhvācāratayā ke cit tathaivaupayikā api.  
33 101.24-6.  
34 131.16-18, at the start of the Āpaddharmaparvan. Bowles reads this passage 
rather less positively, seeing the force of it being contained in verse 18: you 
should not behave this way towards others, lest they behave this way towards 
you (2007, 228). For war as a last resort, see: 69.22; 95.1; 103.22.  
35 137.86-7 (just beyond the Rājadharmaparvan). For the point regarding 
freedom of movement within the kingdom see 57.33, cited above. 
36 See, for example, 15.33. Hiltebeitel is quoting Biardeau.  
37 18.34. This is a dialogue between a mother and her son and the force of the 
argument is that the king should support renouncers rather than becoming one. 
The passage specifies support for ‘those who are naked, have shaven heads or 
have dreadlocks; who wear ochre garments, antelope skin or bark strips,’ some 
of which it is tempting to read in relation to heterodox sects.  
38 The two accounts are at 59.13-141 and 67.18-31, respectively. Both do a very 
sophisticated job of constructing but also constraining the power of the king: the 
first in terms of the superior authority of dharma (the king’s power over all other 
men lasts only ‘so long as he himself conforms’ [59.137]); the second, as 
indicated here, in the approval of his people.  
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39 This will be discussed below. Other statements of the king’s need to win his 
people’s affection include: 57.28-9; 95.3, 5; 120.23. For a more cynical take on 
why he should inspire his subjects’ devotion, however, see 103.39-40: the king 
should earn his people’s trust so he can then exploit them.  
40  References to the people are translating svajanena (57.27), svajano ‘pi 
(94.3), lokasya (93.9). In the first charter myth the paradigmatic king, Pṛthu, is 
created from the body of an earlier prototype, Vena, killed because he failed to 
behave properly towards his subjects. This was the narrative that grounded the 
king’s authority in his conformity to dharma, and the manner of his creation 
provides a strong suggestion of what might happen to a king who fails to do so.  
41 Rich (2010, 85, 135) calls attention to archeological evidence and accounts 
from contemporary travelers suggesting that this was the case in relation to 
similar details found in Kauṭilya’s Arthaśāstra and the Aśokan edicts.  
42 The De Jure Belli of Gentili and the De Jure Belli ac Pacis of Grotius, written in 
1598 and 1625 respectively, are most frequently discussed in regard to the 
history of humanitarian warfare, but Bring, for example, also sees them as 
‘indicating an embryonic human rights thinking’ (2006, 131). He goes on to say 
that ‘[a]lthough Grotius did not articulate a thesis of the inherent dignity of the 
individual as the motivating factor behind his positions, many of his formulations 
indicate a thought in that direction’ (2006, 141). The ideas Bring is referring to 
are very similar to those found in the Rājadharmaparvan. 
43 Donnelly 1990, 59 and, reiterating the point in relation to India, Elder, who 
states that ‘Nowhere in classical Hindu scriptures does one find any suggestion 
that subjects dissatisfied with their king’s performance of his duty (dharma) 
should revolt against him’ (1996, 75). For discussions of the issue across a 
broader range of Indian texts, see: Menski (2007, 9-10); Scharfe (1989, 66ff), 
who argues that while references to exiled kings were common in the later 
Saṃhitās and Brāhmaṇas, the importance of subjects’ approval appears to have 
diminished by the time of the epics and Dharmaśāstras; and Sharma (2003,147-
9), who discusses Scharfe and Kane.  
44 The most important of these debates is an on-going discussion as to whether 
it is birth or behaviour that determines a person’s varṇa, and an example of 
someone who draws on it in a contemporary discussion is Badrinath (2006, 375-
415).  
45 There is little mention of jāti, the other constituent element of caste, in this 
section of the text. 
46 It is no coincidence that Yudhiṣṭhira’s summary of what he has learnt about 
kingship begins with the proper dharma, behaviour and livelihood of each of the 
varṇas (108.1), or that the first act of the newly consecrated king in the second 
charter myth for kingship is to keep everyone joined to their own specific duties 
and actions (67.30, 31). For examples of the many other references to his role in 
maintaining varṇadharma, see 70.3-4 and 87.18.  For his duty to prevent 
varṇasaṃkara see, for example, 68.29. 
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47 Thus, for example, the description of a well-ordered city includes the fact that 
all the varṇas within it pursued their proper tasks (87.18). It should be pointed 
out that being kept within the confines of one’s varṇa is presented as important 
for everyone: it is not just a way of controlling those in the lower varṇas.  
48 Brahmins appear not to pay taxes in some references and cannot be punished 
as severely as other varṇas, while the work of śūdras is to serve the other varṇas 
and there are conflicting opinions as to how much property they should own. On 
these points see, for example: 72.22; 77.7, 9-10 (tax exemptions for brahmins – 
the latter set by implication as it lists exceptions to the rule); 56.31-33; 59.69, 
114; 77.14 (lighter punishments for brahmins); 60.27-35 (discussion of property 
and servitude in relation to śūdras). Menski (2007, 43-8) and Thapar (1966, 32) 
both note the existence of social inequality alongside metaphysical universalism. 
49 Included amongst these complexities are issues of historical contextualization 
such as Olivelle raises in relation to some of the statements concerning śūdras in 
the Manusṃrti, which he reads as a rhetorical response to the śūdra Nandas who 
ruled in the period preceding its composition (and that of the 
Rājadharmaparvan): see 2005, 37-41; 2010, 42-3. There are several verses 
where something similar may be at play here too (e.g. 35.6, 65.8 and 92.3). As 
on most topics in the Mahābhārata debates, statements concerning varṇa served 
a variety of purposes and interacted with a variety of audiences and contexts.   
50 Rich makes a similar point in relation to regulations concerning indentured 
labour/slaves in the Arthaśāstra: ‘What is remarkable is that even for those 
individuals at the bottom of Maurya society, there is more freedom than exised in 
contemporaneous Greek society, not to speak of American society up to the Civil 
War’ (2010, 78). 
51 86.7 It would appear they could be appointed to positions of power outside of 
the judiciary also: in one passage the king is told to appoint a good man, ‘even 
one of low birth’ (120.47), to oversee his affairs.   
52 There is also some indication that śūdras were given the same opportunity to 
enter the different stages of life as kṣatriyas and vaiśyas and also participate in 
worship. For reference to the āśramas, see 63.11-14; for participation in worship, 
see 60.36-9. Both statements are unusual and Fitzgerald discusses some of the 
issues involved in his footnotes on 63.11 and 13 (2004, 730-31) and 60.36-52 
(2004, 726-27). Although the passages go against the general trend in terms of 
śūdras’ participation in the āśramas and sacrificial rituals, their inclusion in the 
text suggests that these issues were rather more contested than is generally 
supposed. Olivelle’s more detailed discussion of the relationship between the 
varṇas and the āśramas (1993, 190-5) points to the same being true across a 
broader range of texts. Inclusion in the āśramas is important because it has been 
linked to the right to education (Thapar 1966, 36; Sharma 2003, 77-84); while 
participation in the sacrifice impacts upon the question of religious freedom. 
53 He has however broadened his argument to say that this idea was alien to 
most societies (2013, 70), part of the shift towards a more even-handed 
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treatment. It should be pointed out that Donnelly is not someone who seeks to 
ground human rights in early European intellectual history: he sees them as 
essentially a product of the modern world (2013, chapter 5).  
54 For the use of these words to distinguish ‘human’ as a category see also, for 
example, 29.20; 30.5, 7; 31.12; 70.5; 73.21. Other words used include manuja, 
to distinguish a human rather than divine birth (38.14) and mānava, used very 
frequently in the sense of ‘person,’ and clearly distinguished as a category in 
contrast to animals, birds and insects in a passage just beyond the 
Rājadharmaparvan  (149.14-22).  
55 Donnelly draws on 11.132 to make his claim, a verse which occurs in a section 
devoted to the expiation for sins, and prescribes the same penance for killing a 
śūdra as for killing various lowly animals. In light of the issue of rhetoric versus 
reality in different parts of the Manusmṛti, briefly mentioned above, it should be 
noted that in the rather more prosaic context of listing penalties for vehicular 
accidents, the fine for killing any human (manuṣya), irrespective of social status, 
is double that for killing even the largest animals (8.296). For other examples of 
‘human’ as a category distinguished from animals in the text see, for example: 
1.43; 7.72; 8.98; 10.86.   
56 This is the passage that lists Greeks, Chinese, etc., ending the list with … 
mlecchāś ca sarvaśaḥ / brahmakṣatraprasūtāś ca vaiśyāḥ śūdrāś ca mānavāḥ. 
I read the mānavāḥ as relating to the whole list: ‘People who are Greeks, etc…. 
and mlecchas in their entirety, and the sons of brahmins and kṣatriyas, and 
vaiśyas and śūdras,’ rather than as setting up any kind of distinction between 
‘mlecchas in their entirety’ and ‘men who are the sons of brahmins, etc.’. This is 
supported by the use of the word in relation to dasyus in v.23. Elsewhere, 67.32 
also uses mānava for people ‘anywhere on the Earth.’ 
57 65.17-22. The first three universal virtues listed in verse 20 – ahiṃsā satyam 
akrodho are identical to those identified as sanātana (along with dāna – 
generosity) in 13.147.22. The idea of sanātana- (eternal) or mānava- (human) 
dharma as a counterbalance to varṇadharma is important for contemporary 
attempts to reinterpret the varṇa system.  
58 Such as killing a non-combatant, touching another’s wife, abducting women 
(131.15).  
59 See, for example: Pollock 1993; Lutgendorf 1995; Dalmia and von Stietencrom 
1995. 
60 For more detailed discussion of these events see Basu 2015. Other articles in 
the same collection (Doniger and Nussbaum 2015) focus on the events from 
different angles.  
61 Modi, for example, citing his record of economic growth, declared that ‘Real 
Raj Dharma is ensuring the welfare of everyone who lives in the state’ (Express 
News Service: May 31, 2012). The Chief Minister of Bihar, meanwhile, to give an 
example of its critical use, was said to have taken ‘a leaf from Mr. Modi’s model 
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of “rajdharm”’ (The Hindu: March 27, 2014) when police stood by while upper 
caste groups attacked dalits in Patna.  
62 Other points could be co-opted into Nationalist narratives too: those regarding 
the safety of women in the well-run ‘Hindu’ kingdom to support claims that 
India’s gender ills were introduced with medieval Muslim rule; those regarding 
varṇa the disavowal of abuses still defining the lived experience of many dalits. 
Even the very discussion of human rights in a Hindu context has been rendered 
murky by the way that ‘human rights’ are so often elided with ‘Hindu rights’ in 
Nationalist writings. For a discussion of some of these issues see Hasan 2015, as 
well as articles by Amartya Sen and Wendy Doniger in the same collection 
(Doniger and Nussbaum 2015). 
63 Descriptions also used to justify the rule of a strong king in a way reminiscent 
of Hobbes (a parallel that Das, amongst others, has noted: 2009, 243). For a 
good illustration of the contrast between these and normative governance see, 
for example, 68.14-35, where conditions in a country not properly ruled is 
immediately followed by those in one which is.  
64 Particularly with some of the accounts of violence against women: see, Human 
Rights Watch April 2002, Vol.14, No.3 (C). Tanika Sarkar’s discussion of gender 
violence in the riots concurs with this (Doniger and Nussbaum 2015, 291-4). 
65 For an interesting discussion of Hindu Nationalism and colonialism see Mehta 
2011, 205-8. 
 
